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NON-REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS:
FOSTERING EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
IN WORKPLACE DECISION-MAKING
Ann G. Leibowitz, Esq.t
Scott C. Moriearty, Esq.#
Robert A Buhiman, Esq. w
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperative models of industrial relations
in the American workplace currently engenders great interest
among political, legal, and academic communities. Much of the
ongoing debate focuses on the ability of American employers to
construct mechanisms for "aligning individual and organization-
al goals," "sharing information," and "seeking employee input,"
without facing accusations of illegally sponsoring a "labor
organization" in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act.1 Several recent developments give substance to
this debate. First, the Fact Finding Report issued by the
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
concluded that worker participation programs "improve the
quality of work life and in some cases raise productivity and
product quality."2  Second, the Electromations and du Pont4
decisions, which set forth certain criteria to be used in deter-
t Ann G. Leibowitz, Esq., is Senior Corporate Attorney and Labor Counsel
to Polaroid Corporation.
t Scott C. Moriearty, Esq., is a Partner at the law firm of Bingham, Dana
& Gould and practices employment law.
tt Robert A. Bulbman, Esq., is an Associate at Bingham, Dana & Gould.
129 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). In July 1993 the Department of Labor issued
a report extolling the virtues of worker participation by recognizing that "[s]ys-
tems of mutually reinforcing practices create multiple ways to develop
workers' skills, to align individual and organizational goals, and to share
information crucial to solving problems." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON
HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (1993),
reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 143, at F-1 (July 28, 1993).
2 COMMISSION ON THE FuRE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEPIT OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT 45 (1994)
[hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT].
3 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994).
4 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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mining the lawfulness of worker participation programs under
the National Labor Relations Act, have created debate concern-
ing the application of the Act to the myriad possibilities for em-
ployer/employee cooperative groups in the workplace. Finally,
recent changes in the composition of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board enhance further speculation as to the Board's
current stance regarding such employee participation groups.
This essay argues that the Act should be construed to allow
greater employer support of employee participation groups in
order to develop further cooperation in industrial relations.
These groups offer valuable insights on issues directly affecting
employees' working lives and provide a forum for the expression
of the views of today's diverse labor force. Ultimately, these
groups may facilitate employee satisfaction in the workplace by
improving the quality of management decisions. While the
adversarial collective bargaining model originally contemplated
by the Act is an important component of industrial democracy,
it should not be enshrined as the only legally permissible model
for formal employee participation in workplace decision-making.
The existing legislation leaves room for a more flexible ap-
proach.
Part I of this essay provides historical information on
collective bargaining in the United States and describes changes
in the workforce that militate in favor of alternative schemes for
interaction between employers and employees. Part II traces
the emphasis on representation in labor organizations espoused
by Congress, the courts, and the National Labor Relations
Board. Finally, Part III of this essay discusses permissible non-
representational employee participation groups.
I. THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN LABOR
Following the Great Depression and the initiatives of the
New Deal, the view that fundamental conflicts of interest
between workers and managers should be regulated superseded
the normative premise that market forces should have free rein
in the labor area.5 Although this view did not enjoy universal
support, New Deal legislation endorsed collective bargaining as
a part of our national policy and as the preferred mechanism to
5 THOMAS KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 22 (1986).
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accommodate "the goals of the parties to the employment
relationship."'
Collective bargaining has played a vital role in providing
employees with a strong voice in the workplace. Many positive
attributes of modern industrial relations, including basic worker
rights, owe their development to the collective bargaining
process. Furthermore, the right to bargain collectively through
representatives who are accountable exclusively to workers is an
essential check on potential coercion, manipulation, or indiffer-
ence by employers. Accordingly, the fundamental right of
employees to bargain collectively must be protected and pre-
served.
However, even if one accepts that "conflict of interest" was
the normative principle at the time the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was passed, why would one assume today that collec-
tive bargaining must be protected as the exclusive lawful meth-
od of employer/employee group interaction?' No normative
principle supports the proposition that collective bargaining
must be the sole method through which employees' groups and
employers are lawfully permitted to interact in today's
workplace.
Despite the truism that some employers and employees
have an incongruence of interests amounting to a conflict, the
fundamental problem with positing "conflict of interest" as the
overarching principle governing labor relations is that this
principle oversimplifies the spectrum of relations between em-
ployees and employers. Almost all employers and employees
share some mutuality of interests. This mutuality justifies a
more cooperative approach to employer/employee relations.
Eliminating employer-sponsored cooperative groups by declaring
them per se unlawful deprives employees of the choice to partic-
ipate in such groups. Restricting the parties to the collective
6 Id. at 24. Although the collective bargaining model was adopted, it was
recognized that workers and management shared common goals, such as a
"common interest in building and maintaining a successful enterprise." Id. at
23. However, the cornerstone of the National Labor Relations Act was the
right of the workers to bargain collectively. Id. at 25-27. This right is most
clearly set forth in § 701 of the Act, which guarantees employees the right to
self-organization, to join labor organizations, and to bargain collectively. 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
7This exclusivity is maintained through the applications of the provisions
of § 8 of the Act, which set forth certain prohibited activities. 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1988).
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bargaining model is unnecessarily paternalistic and cannot be
justified in light of major, ongoing changes that are taking place
in the American workplace.
First, the modern work environment is no longer epitomized
by the large-scale manufacturing operations that employed
principally white, male workers and dominated the American
economy from 1934 until 1955.8 Today's workforce is much
more diverse by gender9 and race."° With the increasingly
varied circumstances, backgrounds, and expectations of this
more diverse workforce, there is a greater need to accommodate
and to address employees' different perspectives on a cross-
sectional basis. The collective bargaining model does not easily
accommodate the presentation of diverse perspectives because
the majority has the power to select the exclusive bargaining
representative." Once the majority selects a representative,
minority points of view may be silenced.
Moreover, today's employees generally are educated better
and are informed better than are those of the past. 2 Thus,
they are more capable of determining where their self-interest
lies and acting accordingly, either through collective bargaining
or by an alternative method. Today's employees generally are
less trusting of authority, whether it is the government, unions,
or employers that claim they know what is best. These workers
have the ability and should be given the opportunity to assess
and to participate in alternatives to collective bargaining. 3
8 FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6, 10, 12. There has been a
steady decline over the last 40 years in the number of nonagricultural, private
sector workers who are members of unions. Whereas approximately 35% of
the nonagricultural, private sector labor force were union members in the
1950s, only 11.2% were union members in 1993. Id. According to this report,
the decline in collective bargaining in the private sector "has created an arena
for employee-management relations in which most employees have no indepen-
dent organization to discuss issues with management." Id. at 24.
e In 1950, 33.9% of women of working age were in the labor force; in 1993,
57.9% were in the labor force. Id. at 10. By contrast, in the same period, the
percentage of males in the labor force dropped from 86.4% to 75.4%, due in
part to declines in the age of retirement. Id.
10 In 1954, approximately 10% of the workforce was non-white, contrasted
with 15.2% in early 1994. Id. at 12.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
12 In 1970, 25.9% of the labor force aged 25-64 years had more than 12
years schooling, contrasted with 52% in 1992. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra
note 2, at 12.
13 A 1985 survey reported that 84% of employees working for organizations
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Of great significance are dramatic changes that have oc-
curred in the United States economy since the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act. The United States now faces
continuous and significant competition worldwide and is the
nation with the greatest debt." To compete successfully, em-
ployers must improve productivity in a global environment in
which competitors benefit by having cooperative relations with
their employees. 5 In addition, the U.S. economy has shifted
"from blue to white-collar occupations, from the North to the
South, and from the manufacturing to the service sector."' 6
These shifts have created diverse expectations and perspectives
in both the workforce as a whole and in the employee makeup
of individual companies. One last change worth noting is that
beginning perhaps with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, our legal
system increasingly has recognized individual, as distinguished
from collective, employment rights.
These various factors emphasize the need for the flexible
development of alternatives to collective bargaining. Through
cooperative ventures between employers and employees who
identify with the goals of the firm (as opposed to viewing the
firm as inimical to their interests), solutions to workplace
problems shaped by input from employees as well as from em-
ployers can lead to a mutually beneficial, higher level of produc-
tivity.'7 Employers need the flexibility to offer employees a
structure to carry on a dialogue regarding terms and conditions
of employment without being required to implement the ad-
versarial collective bargaining model. Ultimately, the collective
bargaining model should be required to compete with alterna-
tive, cooperative models for employee support. The law should
allow workers the latitude to make their own choices without
any presumption about which model, adversarial or cooperative,
without an employee involvement or participation program would like to
participate in one if given the opportunity. Id. at 30 (citing BUSINESS WEEK
and SIROTA AND ALPER AssocIATEs, The 1985 National Survey of Employee
Attitudes, (Sept. 1985)). Ninety percent of employees in organizations with a
plan responded that the plan was a "good idea!" Id.
4 Id. at 3.
'Id. at 41.
'
5 Henry S. Farber, The Extent of Unionization in the United States in
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 53-54 (Thom-
as A. Kochan ed., 1985).
7 See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 34, 37-39, 43-44.
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is in employees' best interest, and it should protect their right to
do so.
II. CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The National Labor Relations Board's broad construction of
National Labor Relations Act sections 8(a)(2)' 8 and 2(5)19 has
to date posed serious obstacles to cooperative programs wel-
comed by workers. The Board should require that representa-
tion of non-participating employees be a necessary precondition
to categorizing any employee group or plan as a "labor organiza-
tion." Express adoption of this requirement, which already is
implicit in the National Labor Relations Act and in many cases
decided by the Board, would permit employers to communicate
directly with groups of employees that could speak for them-
selves concerning terms and conditions of employment. The
legislative history of the Act and the court opinions and Board
decisions interpreting it, offer substantial support for the ex-
press adoption of this requirement. Indeed, no reported case
decided to date by the Board or by the courts appears to express
a contrary view.
In Electromation,° the Board singled out certain passages
from the Senate hearings on the adoption of section (8)(a)(2).
These passages indicate that Congress understood sections 2(5)
and 8(a)(2) to be concerned fundamentally with the issue of
zs Section 8(a)(2) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor orga-
nization or contribute any financial or other support to it: Provided,
That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be
prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during
working hours without loss of time or pay;...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
19 Section 2(5) defines "labor organization" as:
[Any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee represen-
tation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employ-
ers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
20 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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"representation."21 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in virtually
every case construing section 8(a)(2) and its earlier analogue,
the Railway Labor Act of 1926,22 acknowledged that congres-
sional concern was focused on protecting employees' freedom to
select their own representatives to deal with employers. In the
seminal case in this area, Texas & New Orleans Railroad
Company v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,"3
the Court upheld the validity of a judicially enforceable obliga-
tion created by section 2(3) of the Railway Labor Act. The
Court noted that the provision forbade "interference, influence
or coercion exercised by either party over the self-organization
or designation of representatives by the other,"' and stated:
Freedom of choice in the selection of representatives on
each side of the dispute is the essential foundation of
the statutory scheme.... Such collective action [by
employees] would be a mockery if representation were
made futile by interference with freedom of choice.
Thus the prohibition by Congress of interference with
the selection of representatives for the purpose of nego-
tiation and conference between employers and employ-
ees, instead of being an invasion of the constitutional
right of either, was based on the recognition of the
rights of both. 5
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,6 was the
first case to uphold the Board's authority to order the disestab-
lishment of an employer-dominated labor organization. In that
case the Court noted that failure to disestablish the dominated
"Association" might "enabl[e] the employer to induce adherence
of employees to the Association in the mistaken belief that it
21 See Id. at 992-94.
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 2(3), 44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926) (current
version at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988)).
23 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
24 Id.
2 Id. at 569-70.
26 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
19941
40 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:33
was truly representative and afforded an agency for collective
bargaining.
27
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,28 the Court distinguished
an employer's right to confer directly with its employees under
the provisions of section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act from prohibited "dealing" under section 8(a)(2) of the Act by
emphasizing the unique representative function of a labor organiza-
tion.2 ' The point, as the Cabot Carbon Court noted, is that
section 8(a)(2) addresses impermissible interference with the
representational role or agency function of a "labor organiza-
tion," whereas section 9(a) simply permits personal or group
airing of grievances.
The Supreme Court consistently has found that section
8(a)(2) is directed at the evil of corruption through domination,
interference, or support of the agency relationship or represen-
tational status of a labor organization. In the context of em-
ployer-initiated programs, the principle is that the employer vio-
lates the law if it foists on its employees a body that employees
have not freely chosen but that purports to represent them.
Finally, the National Labor Relations Board has never, in a
section 8(a)(2) context, found a "labor organization" to exist if it
did not purport in some capacity to "represent" the interests of
absent or non-participatory employees.3 ° Moreover, the few de-
cisions in which the Board did not find employer-initiated
committees, teams, or panels to be "labor organizations" did not
27 Id. at 271.
28 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
2' The court observed that:
The amendment to § 9(a) does not say that an employer may form
or maintain an employee committee for the purpose of 'dealing with'
the employer, on behalf of employees, concerning grievances. On
the contrary the amendment to § 9(a) simply provides, in substance,
that any individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right personally to present their own grievances to the employer
.... It is thus evident that there is nothing in the amendment of
§ 9(a) that authorizes an employer to engage in 'dealing with' an
employer-dominated 'abor organization' as the representative of his
employees concerning their grievances.
Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added).
" In Electromation, the Board expressly declined to adopt a "representa-
tion" requirement, as was advocated in Member Devaney's concurrence. 309
N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.20 (1992). Only Member Raudabaugh, however, rejected
outright such a requirement. Id. at 1007 n.13 (Raudabaugh, Member, concur-
ring).
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so find precisely because the entity under consideration did not
represent employees.3 '
Two well-known NLRB cases in which adjudicatory bodies
were found not to be labor organizations clearly illustrate that
"dealing" necessarily connotes a representational function that
is lacking when the body in question simply decides matters
rather than acts as an advocate, representative, or agent for
other employees. In Sparks Nugget Inc.,2 the Board found
that an employees' council was not a labor organization because
it did not act "in any manner as an advocate of employee inter-
ests."3  The Board distinguished Cabot Carbon and other
cases relied on by the Administrative Law Judge, observing that
in those cases "the organizations in question 'dealt with' the
respective employers in the same sense as the employees' advo-
cates., 34  Similarly, in Mercy-Memorial Hospital Corp., 5 the
Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that
an employer's grievance committee was not a labor organization
because it was not "formed for the purpose of dealing with the,
[employer] on behalf of employees concerning their grievanc-
es.
36
Most recently, in the Electromation"7 and du Pont" deci-
sions, the Board focused on the "dealing with" requirement of
section 2(5) without recognizing that in order to determine
whether a group "deals with" an employer, it must first be
determined whether the group "represents" non-participating
employees. Nevertheless, Electromation and du Pont present
the Board's current interpretation of the outer reach of the
"dealing with" criterion. The Board distinguished "dealing," a
31 The clearest statement of this position is found in the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge, which was affirmed by the Board in General Foods
Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977) (finding that the essence of a labor
organization, as this term has been construed by the Board and the courts, is
a group or a person who stands in an agency relationship to a larger body on
whose behalf it is called upon to act).
32 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977).
33Id. at 276.
34 Id.
35 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
3s d. at 1121.
37 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994).
' E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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bilateral mechanism involving employee proposals and employer
consideration of such proposals, from permissible mechanisms
such as brainstorming groups, suggestion boxes or meetings,
and analogous information exchanges. 9
In both Electromation and du Pont, the employees' commit-
tees involved were found to be acting in a representative capaci-
ty for employees who were not present for the discussions with
members of management. However, du Pont's all-day "safety
conferences" were found to be lawful. Thus, although only discuss-
ing the "dealing with" requirement, Electromation and du Pont
suggest that input from employees is permissible in a group
setting if it amounts only to learning about employees' thoughts,
perceptions, and reactions. Accordingly, although these cases do
not expressly adopt a representational requirement, they sup-
port its logical corollary: It is permissible for employers and
individual employees to discuss employees' thoughts on terms
and conditions of employment in a group setting without run-
ning afoul of section 8(a)(2).
III. PERMISSIBLE NON-REPRESENTATIONAL GROUPS
A major purpose behind non-representational groups is to
permit employees in a group setting to inform management of
their views concerning particular issues. From the outset,
however, it is important to articulate what these "non-represen-
tational" groups would and would not do. By definition, neither
the group as a whole nor its participants would "represent" any
other employees. Thus, employee elections to these groups
would be problematic lest participating employees be perceived
as agents for the whole or for a segment of the employee popula-
tion. Participating employees would not speak for other employ-
ees or bind other employees to conditions or agreements. These
parameters must be clear because they distinguish non-repre-
sentational groups from representational bodies that "deal with"
management on behalf of non-participating employees, as that
concept has developed through the legislative history, case law,
and Board decisions discussed above.
Group participants could, however, express and present
individual views in a group setting on issues that impact direct-
ly on employees' working lives, both to members of management
39 Id. at 894; Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21.
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and to each other.4' By listening to each others' perspectives
on a particular issue under discussion, each participant, wheth-
er employee or manager, could hear and could be influenced by
views other than his or her own. Indeed, communication within
such a group would be the principal advantage of a group forum
(as opposed, for example, to employee surveys or suggestion
boxes), because the perspectives presented by the participants
likely would vary according to their respective needs, back-
grounds, and desires. Additionally, because such a group would
not be a labor organization, there would be no need to limit the
type of issues it could consider.
On the other hand, participants could not present group
proposals to management lest the group be seen as "dealing" in
a manner prohibited by law. Any decision following group
discussion clearly and unilaterally would be made by manage-
ment. It would be important from a functional and from a legal
standpoint that all employees understand this outcome.
Although the analogy may be imperfect in some respects, a
non-representative employee group might function similarly to
the way a focus group fimctions in market research. Employees
can be been as "customers" of terms and conditions of employ-
ment such as wages, benefits, and perquisites in the same way
that in commerce consumers are "customers" for products and
services. Management would present to the non-representative
employee group a proposal for addressing a particular employ-
ment issue. In turn, management would receive feedback
through the dynamic of group and individual interaction and
through discussion from those most affected by the issue, just as
a focus group of consumers provides customer feedback to
sellers on likes and dislikes, needs and wants, and strengths
and weaknesses of a proposed commercial product or service. In
this way, employees could influence management decision-mak-
ing in an effective, constructive, and cooperative way, even
though they would not represent or in any way speak on behalf
of other employees.
One distinct advantage of such a construct is that the group
participants could be selected to reflect the demographics of the
workplace with respect to gender, race, nationality, age, and job
40 These groups could be comprised, for example, of 20 to 30 participants;
large enough to create a group dynamic but sufficiently small to allow each of
the participants to speak. The administrative costs of the group legally would
be paid by management, and employees would not be penalized for time away
from their jobs while participating in such a group.
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type - a diversity atypical of elected bodies in general. Ac-
cordingly, such a group could reflect the range of opinions in a
company's work force on whatever particular issue were being
discussed. It thus would provide management with an opportu-
nity prior to decision-making for consultation with a spectrum
of the employees affected by the decision.
If employees conclude that participation in such a group
fails to meet their needs or expectations, they would be free to
refuse to continue participating in it. They would be protected
by law if they choose instead to organize into traditional collec-
tive bargaining units. However, management and employees
should be permitted legally to pursue alternatives such as non-
representational groups, and the law should allow employees to
decide for themselves if such groups are effective.
Effectiveness, like beauty, is often in the eye of the behold-
er. One recently published study indicates that employees, as
well as management, recognize and appreciate the virtues of
cooperative arrangements. Professors Richard Freeman of
Harvard University and Joel Rogers of the University of Wiscon-
sin recently conducted a survey of twenty-four thousand workers
representing fifty-six million people in companies with at least
twenty-five employees.4 By a margin of three to one, workers
preferred a "powerless" but influential form of employee par-
ticipation in workplace decision-making over a "powerful" one
that did not enjoy a cooperative relationship with manage-
ment.42 Paternalistic arguments outlawing employee partic-
ipation groups as "inherently coercive," especially in the absence
of any other evidence of employer coercion, should not be used
to curtail employee choice in these matters.
CONCLUSION
Depicting the modern work environment as a "conflict of
interest" between an overbearing employer and comparatively
powerless workers is an unwarranted oversimplification. In
today's workplace, it is unjustifiable to maintain a regulatory
scheme that makes adversarial collective bargaining the sole
means of employer engagement with groups of employees over
terms and conditions of employment. The National Labor
41 Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, Worker Representation and Participa-
tion Survey: First Report of Findings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at D1.
42 Id.
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Relations Act should be construed to permit management
interaction with non-representational groups regarding these
issues. Such groups are not "labor organizations" within the
scope of the Act's regulation.
Permitting non-representational employee groups to engage
lawfully with employers improves employee satisfaction because
it allows employees the opportunity to influence decisions that
affect employees' working lives. It improves the quality of
management decision-making because it gives management the
benefit of employee input. In this way, employers and employ-
ees can, as long as the parties are amenable, collaborate to
effectuate their mutual best interests. If employees became
dissatisfied with their circumstances, they could choose to
organize independently for purposes of traditional collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. The legal
machinery of the National Labor Relations Board should be
dedicated to guarding that choice, free from actual employer
interference or restraint. However, it should not presume
coercion solely based on the existence of a non-representational
employee participation structure.
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